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Once Again, the Russia-Ukraine Battle over Gas 
about Much More than Economics 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Here we go again.  
 
On January 1, for the second time in three years, Russia turned off the gas to 
Ukraine. The move came despite Ukraine’s full payment for all gas received in 
2008 and despite Ukraine’s requests to continue negotiating.  
 
At its core, Russia’s action demonstrates clearly that the country is prepared to 
use intimidation as much more than a last resort, while resorting to what appear 
to be very shallow pretexts as justification. 
 
In a full-court, multi-lingual public relations campaign, Russia’s Gazprom gas 
monopoly has listed a series of grievances that seemingly allowed it no choice, 
but to turn off the gas. These include an alleged failure to pay debts owed for gas, 
an attempt by Ukraine to demand Russia pay more for transiting Europe’s gas 
through its territory and Ukraine’s “apparent unwillingness to move towards fair 
market prices for gas supplies.” (1) 
 
These claims are similar to those made on 1 January 2006 when Gazprom 
turned off Ukraine’s gas for the first time – particularly the claims about payment. 
The difference now is that these claims have much less basis in fact. 
 
In 2006, Ukraine privately admitted owing a significant debt to Gazprom and 
requested a combination of debt forgiveness and a settling of the debt through 
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return of gas in storage. The country also stubbornly demanded an arbitrary gas 
price far below market value.  
 
In 2008, Ukraine did accrue short-term debt for gas during the fall months, but 
settled most of that debt by early December, and the rest with a payment of 
$1.55 billion several days before the end of 2008. The conflict this year concerns 
between $500 million and $650 million in late fees, penalties, and administrative 
fees that Gazprom suggests are owed. The figure has risen since the conflict 
began, even though no gas is being provided. 
 
Ukraine disputes those fees and has begun the process of asking the Stockholm 
Board of Arbitration for a ruling. It is likely that the country will owe at least a 
portion of the fees, but the final figure is in dispute. Unlike accepted Western 
practice, Gazprom has chosen not to wait for an arbitrator’s decision before 
acting on these disputed debts. 
 
Furthermore, Ukraine’s price negotiations this year are far from arbitrary and 
designed to move the country from an unsupportable below-market price to a 
clear market price by 1 January 2011. 
 
Just three months ago, on 2 October 2008, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko and Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a memorandum 
detailing the framework for gas negotiations and agreement. The two “confirmed 
their intention” to move gradually in a three-step process “over the next three 
years to market, economically-based … prices for the importation of gas to 
Ukrainian consumers and the tariffs for gas transit across the territory of Ukraine.” 
(2) 
 
Following the meeting, Tymoshenko announced that Ukraine would pay 50% of 
average market price in 2009, 75% in 2010 and 100% of market price in 
2011. Neither Putin nor Gazprom disputed this account of their negotiations. 
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The question, of course, is – what is market price?  
 
On 27 December, during negotiations with Ukraine’s neighbor Belarus over that 
country’s gas price, Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov announced that the 
price would decrease by mid-2009 “for all European partners, for the Baltic states, 
and for Moldova” as gas prices caught up with oil prices. Moreover, Kupriyanov 
confirmed that Belarus’ price would not increase as significantly as earlier 
predicted. (3)  
 
In 2008, Belarus paid $129 per 1000 cubic meters of gas, or $50 less than 
Ukraine. That figure undermines statements by some who criticize Ukraine’s 
agreement as enshrined in the October memorandum. Chris Weafer, chief 
strategist at Russia’s UralSib, for example, yesterday supported Gazprom’s 
decision to demand a major increase in Ukraine’s gas price. Gazprom’s 
international investors, he said, “did not sign up to be part of anybody's foreign 
aid program.” (4) 
 
Ukraine has responded to this type of criticism by offering to increase its gas 
price by approximately 40% to $235 per 1000 cubic meters. However, in a joint 
letter to Gazprom, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko suggested that the transit fee 
paid to Ukraine for exclusive use of the country’s pipelines ($1.6 mcm/km) is not 
enough to allow adequate maintenance of the pipeline system. Ukraine charges 
that the fee is at least three times below the figure paid to Western European 
partners. Gazprom has not disputed this claim, but suggests that the transit price 
is a “separate contract” that is not being negotiated. 
 
Ukraine has drawn a line in the sand, however. It wants some level of increase in 
transit fees in any agreement. 
 
Ignoring this demand, Gazprom today suggested that Ukraine must pay $418 per 
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1000 cubic meters, which it said represents full market price. Gazprom officials 
suggest that Ukraine’s rejection of a Gazprom offer of $250 per 1,000 cubic 
meters means that all previous agreements were nullified.  
 
But what about that $250 offer? Given Ukraine’s counter-offer of $235, it appears 
that Russia is refusing to provide gas over a difference of $15 per 1000 cubic 
meters, a request to increase transit fees and a planned submission of late fees 
for an arbitrator’s opinion. Are these insurmountable issues? Are we to 
understand that no compromise can result from two sides that appear so close? 
 
Apparently so.  
 
This action once again seems to indicate that, if negotiations don’t proceed 
exactly as its leaders would like, Russia is prepared to respond with displays of 
power and intimidation instead of compromise. From the first Ukraine gas cut-off 
in 2006, to another gas shut-off in Moldova that same year, to arbitrary food 
embargoes of its neighbors’ products, to the August invasion of Georgia, Russia 
is always prepared to show its might. 
 
Russia has demonstrated a willingness to force a deal on its terms using both 
economic and military methods. And few countries have stood their ground. 
Those that have—like the tiny Republic of Georgia—usually have done so alone 
and have paid a price. 
 
Of course, there are reasons why Russia is irritated with Ukraine. The country fell 
behind in its gas payments last fall and paid accounts for September through 
November late. Yushchenko has refused to extend Russia’s lease of the 
Sevastopol naval base in Crimea and has pushed to secure a NATO 
membership action plan. Ukraine also has limited the use of the Russian 
language in films and begun enforcing laws that limit the number of hours of 
Russian language programming on television. 
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But what now? Unlike 2006, when Ukraine had little gas storage and seemed 
desperate for a return of the gas flow, in 2008, its leaders have hardened their 
position. Ukraine now says it has amassed enough gas in storage to last until 
April without gas deliveries. It is unclear, however, how much damage a 
protracted disagreement would cause to Ukraine’s already fragile economy. Its 
production facilities rely on gas for power. 
 
For its part, Russia has not said how long it can maintain a lower gas pressure in 
the pipeline. The shut off to Ukraine in 2006 lowered pipeline pressure so 
significantly that power distributors in Italy and France were forced to shut down 
their plants. So far this situation has not repeated itself.  
 
But for each week Russia does not provide gas to Ukraine, Gazprom could lose 
up to $200 million in payments. Within days it will become clear just how long 
Russia is willing to go without a gas contract, and just what it is willing to do to 
get one. 
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) Statement by Gazprom, 1 Jan 08, http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/.  
(2) “About the gas sphere,” 2 Oct 08, memorandum signed in Moscow by Prime 
Ministers Vladimir Putin and Yulia Tymoshenko. In Russian. Copy available from 
the author. Also see ???? ????????? ??????? "???? ??????," Ukrayinska 
Pravda, 3 Oct 08, in Ukrainian and Russian.  
(3) “Gazprom: Gas price for Belarus in 2009 to be higher than in 2008, but lower 
than contract amount,” Interfax, 27 Dec 08 as reproduced in Kyiv Post, 1750 
GMT, 27 Dec 08. 
(4) “Russia cuts off gas to Ukraine,” Agence France Presse, 1 January 08 via 
Google News. 
 
 6 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2009 
This article was originally published at https://www.bu.edu/iscip/bbn/v7n1.html. 
 
